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ABSTRACT
Introduction: The variety of organisations providing
National Health Service (NHS)-funded services in
England is growing. Besides NHS hospitals and general
practitioners (GPs), they include corporations, social
enterprises, voluntary organisations and others. The
degree to which these organisational types vary,
however, in the ways they manage and provide services
and in the outcomes for service quality, patient
experience and innovation, remains unclear. This
research will help those who commission NHS services
select among the different types of organisation for
different tasks.
Research questions: The main research questions
are how organisationally diverse NHS-funded service
providers vary in their responsiveness to patient
choice, NHS commissioning and policy changes; and
their patterns of innovation. We aim to assess the
implications for NHS commissioning and managerial
practice which follow from these differences.
Methods and analysis: Systematic qualitative
comparison across a purposive sample (c.12) of
providers selected for maximum variety of
organisational type, with qualitative studies of patient
experience and choice (in the same sites). We focus is
on NHS services heavily used by older people at high
risk of hospital admission: community health services;
out-of-hours primary care; and secondary care
(planned orthopaedics or ophthalmology). The
expected outputs will be evidence-based schemas
showing how patterns of service development and
delivery typically vary between different organisational
types of provider.
Ethics, benefits and dissemination: We will
ensure informants’ organisational and individual
anonymity when dealing with high profile case studies
and a competitive health economy. The frail elderly is a
key demographic sector with significant policy and
financial implications. For NHS commissioners,
patients, doctors and other stakeholders, the main
outcome will be better knowledge about the relative
merits of different kinds of healthcare provider.
Dissemination will make use of strategies suggested by
patient and public involvement, as well as DH and
service-specific outlets.
INTRODUCTION
English health policy, particularly Equity and
excellence: Liberating the NHS,1 any qualiﬁed
provider (AQP) policy, and patient choice
policy,2 aims to promote competition among
existing NHS providers3 and the provision of
NHS-funded services by diverse providers.
These include corporations, professional
partnerships, owner-managed small ﬁrms,
social enterprises, cooperatives, voluntary
organisations, NHS foundation trusts and
various hybrids4 5 such as having a ‘prime
contractor’ provider subcontract others6 and
the accountable care organisations foreseen
in the Five Year Forward View.7 Such variations
in ownership8 9 and management10–12 raise
questions about how these providers differ
in their reactions to the different media of
power which commissioners potentially exer-
cise over them,13 hence differ in the ways
that they implement health policy and NHS
commissioners’ aims; or indeed whether
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Addresses the policy relevant research issue of
diverse provision of National Health Service
(NHS)-funded services.
▪ Evidence-based schemas will show how different
organisational types of provider vary in their
typical patterns of service development and
delivery.
▪ Research findings are expected to inform the
NHS commissioning process, provider develop-
ment policy and competition policy.
▪ This protocol does not include quantitative ana-
lysis of the patterns or consequences of diverse
provision.
▪ It focuses on patients’ experience of choice
rather than on continuity and (other aspects of )
quality of care under diverse provision.
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commissioners will constrain them all so narrowly as to
allow little variation.
Studies of other sectoral and national contexts
suggest that different types of provider may vary in the
services produced,14 patient groups served,15–17 size,
prices,15 18–20 contractual ﬂexibility,21 22 transparency,23
responsiveness to ﬁnancial incentives,24 25 perceived trust-
worthiness,26 clinical outcomes27 and service quality.28 29
Different ownership might also predict different selec-
tions of innovations and technologies.30–33 These differ-
ences imply different responses to governments’ and
commissioners’ power, to competition and competitors,
patient and public participation, and inequalities in
access. In contrast, other studies report different organ-
isational types converging in productivity, managerial
practices,34 35 production costs36 and use of mergers.37
Providers with large market shares tend to set pricing and
quality patterns for the whole health system,15 so the
behaviour of different types of provider may depend
partly on the overall mix38 and converge over time.
It is also unclear whether diverse providers react
differently to their regulatory and policy environment
(eg, the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) guidance and the Francis report39)
and whether NHS foundation trusts will increase their
privately-paid income40 41 towards the 49% limit. Again
some studies associate ‘possibility of competition’ with
higher efﬁciency42 and quality43–46 while others47–49
suggest the opposite. Neither body of research differenti-
ates between provider types. The literature is also
divided as to whether professional cultures vary between
providers and the importance attaching to this.50–52
The scientiﬁc rationale of this study is therefore to
extend and clarify previous research on provider diversi-
ﬁcation (not just competition). It will investigate mul-
tiple outcomes, analyse them longitudinally and trace
them to organisational factors which produce any
observed differences in behaviour between provider
types, that is, differences in the outcomes which they
produce as organisations and in the organisational
means by which they produce those outcomes.
The policy rationale is to explore how the NHS and
decision-makers within it, including clinicians who refer
patients to other organisations, might exploit and inﬂu-
ence that behaviour. This is important because the diver-
sity of NHS providers is increasing. For example, private
hospitals now do some 20% of NHS-funded hip and
knee replacements,40 an estimated 31% of the £9.7bn
NHS funding of community health services in England
in 2012–2013 was paid to non-NHS providers.53
Out-of-hours GP services in England are now mostly
provided by social enterprises or commercial
organisations.54
Franchising NHS services to private providers excites
Parliamentary55 and public56 debate. Reports and legisla-
tion (such as the Francis Report and the Care Act) are
intended to shape provider behaviour irrespective of
provider diversity. NHS Payments by Results are
structured to promote quality rather than price competi-
tion. However, NHS commissioners’ control over all
types of provider is weakened by information asymmetry
in the providers’ favour, and commissioners’ lack of
managerial capacity.12 13 Both the Commons Public
Accounts Committee and the Audit Commission have
considered whether more diverse provision may weaken
provider accountability to (NHS) commissioners.57 58
This research aims to reduce this asymmetry by giving
NHS commissioners more evidence-based knowledge as
to which types of providers appear adapted to which
market niches, the likely consequences of changing
from one type of provider to another, where the man-
agerial strengths and weaknesses of different types of
provider lie, and which parts of NHS operational plans,
contracts and guidance they tend to ﬁnd easiest and
hardest to comply with. That evidence should inform
provider selection, alongside the monitoring (and if
necessary, remedying) of provider performance. We
hypothesise that the narrower provider freedoms are,
the more uniform diverse providers’ behaviour is likely
to be in these respects. Conversely, variation is evidence
of the extent to which providers have and use the free-
doms which Liberating the NHS mentions. Evidence on
these points would strengthen the evidence base for
future guidance and health policy debates.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The strongest reason for expecting a diverse provider
landscape to beneﬁt the NHS is that diverse providers
may deliver and develop services in different ways, creat-
ing variants from which NHS commissioners can select.
Partly to test this assumption, we want to understand
more about the effects and implications of provider
diversiﬁcation, and the mechanisms by which provider
diversiﬁcation has these effects. Our study therefore asks
how the organisationally diverse providers of
NHS-funded services vary in respect of:
1. Their responses to patients’ and service users’ rights
to choose their healthcare provider, in those parts of
the NHS quasi-market where providers compete to
attract individual referrals and the payments that
follow (‘competition in markets’)?
2. Responses to NHS commissioning changes, in those
parts of the NHS quasi-market where providers
compete for contracts to provide whole services
(‘competition for markets’), speciﬁcally, what:
A. Role providers play in service design?
B. Provider-commissioner interactions focus on
(clinical outcomes, transactions and procure-
ment, other matters)?
C. Responses local commissioner requirements
(eg, accommodating changed referral patterns,
collaboration with local authorities, targeting
deprived populations) produce?
D. Responses national policy requirements (eg, the
Fair Playing Field Review, or for productivity,
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impacts on outcomes, public involvement, trans-
parency of provider activity) produce?
3. Use of information for commissioning purposes?
4. Providers’:
A. Use of freedom to innovate (in particular, for
NHS Foundation Trusts)?
B. Responses to potential innovations, speed of
response and ensuing service changes?
5. Implications for commissioning and managerial prac-
tice which follow from the above, enabling the NHS
to make better use of provider diversity.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Design
Since policy interventions are beyond researchers’
control an observational study is the strongest feasible
design. A focus on theory-driven qualitative methods is
also required in order to understand how the different
managerial regimes inside the ‘black box’ of the private
or public ﬁrm inﬂuence behaviour.59 As a framework we
will we use organisational theory, with institutional and
transaction cost economics.60 61 Using that framework
we will systematically compare different organisational
types of provider. Our empirical focus will be on care
groups that contain high proportions of older people at
high risk of hospital admissions and readmissions,
planned and unplanned. This will also enable us to
examine how different provider types vary in terms of
the patient journey across interorganisational interfaces.
For primary care we focus on community health services
(CHS) (district nursing, allied health professional ser-
vices etc) and out-of-hours (OOH) GP services. We will
examine hospital services both at whole-hospital level
and in depth in certain specialities. Orthopaedics was an
obvious choice but since it has already been studied we
add ophthalmology. We will consider commissioning
only in respect of how provider participation in commis-
sioning differs (not commissioner structures or account-
ability, market entry and exit), and competition insofar
as it exposes differences in provider behaviour.
The ﬁrst strand of work is therefore a systematic com-
parison of organisational case studies of commissioner–
provider interactions. Each case study will represent a
different combination of provider type and services. The
second strand is a qualitative tracer study of patient
experience and choice, conducted in the same sites. We
will draw on older patients with recent experience of
each provider/service combination.
Comparative organisational case studies
By making and systematically comparing organisational
case studies we will explore differences between and
within provider types regarding:
1. Innovations: both internally-generated and externally-
mandated innovations, including any aimed at
seldom heard and deprived care groups or popula-
tions and/or involving new uses of information.
2. Dealing with commissioners, focusing on providers’ con-
tribution to service design; participation in commis-
sioning activity; engagement with the public; and
response to inequalities of access and outcomes
(eg, how providers and commissioners target seldom
heard and deprived care groups or populations).
3. Information availability and use: whether different pro-
vider types use information differently when dealing
with commissioners; how far the available informa-
tion enables commissioners to compare provider
performance with commissioners’ requirements
and other providers’ performance (or offerings);
any barriers to provider transparency and account-
ability (eg, compliance with Francis report
recommendations).
Each ‘case’ (unit of analysis) will be one type of pro-
vider in one of four focal currently provided services
(CHS, OOH or hospital specialty). Although this may
change during the study period, each of these services
currently has between three and ﬁve main provider
types (a different selection for each service). This
includes NHS Trusts and a growing number of hybrids
(chieﬂy consortia established to deliver particular com-
missions). Table 1 shows which combinations of provider
type and focal service are currently (early 2016) found
in the English NHS.
To cover the most common variants thus implies at
least 12 case studies. For each service we will make a
purposive sample of Clinical Commissioning Groups
(CCGs) that will together give us a maximum-variety
sample of provider types. We will use our existing data-
base developed for an earlier study13 and contacts with
national organisations to select CCGs having low supply
side concentration and high spending on non-NHS pro-
viders (markers for plural provision). As study sites, we
will where possible select CCGs where we can co-locate
more than one case study, for example, CCGs having
more than one type of provider for a given service, so as
to abstract from differences between local health system
contexts and reduce research costs. Similarly, we will if
possible select providers where we can co-locate case
studies of more than one of the focal services. We will
try to avoid sites already being researched for related
projects.
We will identify key informants by snowballing from
Chief Executives in provider organisations but expect
that they will include a clinical director and, for commis-
sioners, the contract manager with whom they deal dir-
ectly. We will interview these informants using a
semistructured interview schedule covering the themes
noted above, observe the provider-commissioner meet-
ings, and content-analyse the managerial documents
indicated as seminal by the key informants. We will
collect data during 2015–2017, both prospectively (in
‘real time’) about foreseeable changes in NHS require-
ments on providers (eg, revisions to QOF (Quality and
Outcomes Framework), GP contracts, CQUIN
(Commissioning for Quality and Innovation) and HRG
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(Healthcare Resource Groups) tariffs; outcomes frame-
work; high-priority NICE guidance) and retrospectively
about recent major policy and/or environmental
changes (eg, cuts in commissioner spending and CCGs’
development as the main commissioners).
Using framework analysis,62 63 we will collate these
data and systematically compare provider types in order
to establish:
1. How providers behave in response to externally-
originated innovations, patients’ demands, and
commissioner requirements so as to indicate how dif-
ferent types of provider attempt to use their ‘free-
doms’, as deﬁned in post-2010 policy documents.2 6 64
2. How commissioners and regulatory bodies respond
to providers’ behaviour, indicating what ‘freedoms’
providers have in practice.
3. What information, and other media of control,13 pro-
viders and commissioners use during their interac-
tions, including variations in how different types of
provider use information.
4. How inequalities of access and outcome are dealt
with.
The analytic framework will include a category for
CCG-speciﬁc characteristics (eg, local decisions, local
histories of provision), and we will compare published
administrative data about the study sites characteristics
against national patterns, to identify any differences
study sites that reﬂect CCG rather than provider
characteristics. We will also analyse the data inductively
to reveal any patterns unforeseen by the researchers.
Tracer studies of patient experience
To trace patient experiences in the study sites, we will
conduct qualitative research with patients and members
of the public because they have privileged knowledge of
patient choice (‘competition in markets’), which has
been a central policy rationale for provider diversity. As
another policy outcome which may vary across different
types of provider, we will assess whether commissioning
decisions have become more democratically account-
able, including the impacts of, and any changes in,
patient and public involvement (PPI) arrangements.
To identify which aspects of choice are important to
patients and any sensitivities, we will start by holding
focus groups of representatives of patient organisations.
We will use these groups to explore which aspects of
service provision patients would like to have choices
about; whether they actually have these choices; and
how different organisations consult and/or involve
patient organisations when decision-making. We will
analyse participants’ responses by induction from focus
group transcripts, pooling data across focus groups on
the assumption that patients’ preferences about choice
in a given service are independent of provider type.
We will invite SW Peninsula CLAHRC Patient
Involvement Group (PenPIG), Healthwatch and local
groups indicated by the CCG and/or providers in the
study sites, and (from websites or by snowballing) any
other local groups involved with the services we are
focusing on.
We will then interview patients who have used each
case study service within the past 3 months (to reduce
recall bias). Formal sampling calculations are not rele-
vant to this type of exploratory qualitative research. We
will interview patients until data saturation. Ideally we
will identify patients by ﬁle-sampling providers’ patient
lists (excluding patients under 65 and/or receiving ter-
minal care and/or with cognitive impairment). But if
providers cannot accommodate this we will recruit
patients through CCGs and their general practices. The
interviews will be semistructured, using themes derived
from the focus groups and published research. From
the interview transcripts we will write, then systematic-
ally compare, tracer studies,65 reporting what choices
patients were offered, which aspects of care were
covered, patients’ experiences of choice-making, and its
consequences. Again we will analyse the data induct-
ively to reveal any patterns unforeseen by the
researchers.
In addition, we will set up an advisory panel, inviting
representation from patient organisations. Its role will be
to advise on important issues to focus attention on,
methods and likely problems in collecting data for the
patient tracer study, the website content and usability,
and any other topics relevant to the project that they
wish to raise. We will support the above involvement by
meeting the participants’ costs of participation (eg,
travel costs) and paying an honorarium.
Table 1 Combinations of provider type and focal service found in the English NHS in early 2016
Hospital
orthopaedics
Hospital
ophthalmology
Community health
services GP out-of-hours
Corporate
Proprietary
Not-for-profit
Public firm
Cooperative
Voluntary
Professional partnership
White cells indicate combinations that currently exist, grey cells combinations not found.
GP, general practitioner; NHS, National Health Service.
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Synthesising the organisational and patient studies
By collating these ﬁndings we will assemble a behav-
ioural proﬁle for each provider type, exploring which
behaviours appear characteristic of, for example, foun-
dation trusts, corporate providers, or social enterprises
and how the local health economy context appears to
inﬂuence that behaviour. Comparing these proﬁles will
show the respects in which provider behaviour varies.
Attributing observed provider behaviour to a reform
programme is inherently complex. In realist evaluation
terms, current policy1 2 7 assumes that the mechanism
by which provider diversiﬁcation policy has its intended
effects is:
1. Commissioners strengthen patient and public partici-
pation, focus attention on health outcomes and
inequalities, and develop the infrastructure (eg, infor-
mation systems) necessary to implement reform pol-
icies through commissioning.
2. They commission more diverse providers.
3. More diverse provider behaviour results in innov-
ation, a concern for quality, better use of informa-
tion, and greater responsiveness to patients’
preferences.
4. This causes greater achievement of the policy out-
comes1 above.
The methods we propose are thus intended to gener-
ate evidence of the extent to which the observed pro-
vider behaviours can be attributed to the reforms and
present some diagnostic evidence should that attribution
not be conﬁrmed.
ETHICS, BENEFIT AND DISSEMINATION
The project has ethical approval (Ref. 15/EM/0089).
We will obtain research governance permissions site by
site. This is non-clinical research and the ethical compli-
cations of interviewing especially vulnerable people or
informant deception do not arise. We will observe meet-
ings only with the participants’ consent. We will conduct
patient and PPI in the same sites, providers and services
as the organisational case studies. We will also include
PPI as a research method by involving patients in reﬁn-
ing research questions, providing data and advising the
researchers. To preserve informant anonymity we will
pseudonymise our informants and, where applicable,
their organisations, and avoid deﬁnite descriptions
(descriptions so speciﬁc that only one organisation
matches them) in research reports and publications,
unless we obtain informants’ written permission not to.
We will keep data that identify informants or their orga-
nisations in password-protected electronic storage with
the option of encryption or (for paper) in locked cabi-
nets in locked private ofﬁces.
Expected beneﬁts from this research relate to commis-
sioning and referral practice. We aim to enable NHS
commissioners to select and make contracts with provi-
ders in a more informed way. This would include indi-
cating which forms of monitoring (use of information)
and incentives are most effective with different provider
types. We also aim to inform provider development
policy, by contributing to the evidence about, for
example, which kinds of provider appear best qualiﬁed
for particular roles in local health economies, and for
the same reasons, help inform clinicians who, in making
a referral, select a provider on behalf of their patient.
This would help support an informed contestability of
service provision. Similarly, such ﬁndings have potential
to inform the organisational development of NHS foun-
dation trusts and to inform competition policy by con-
tributing evidence about the preferred market niches of
different kinds of provider.
Our dissemination plans for patient informants will be
shaped by PPI but are likely to include local meetings,
probably, for practical reasons, one per study site. We
will feed our ﬁndings back to managerial informants
(who may include local authority and Health and
Well-Being Board members) at face-to-face meetings.
Our experience suggests that managers also appreciate
opportunities to discuss the practical implications of
research ﬁndings with peers elsewhere, so we will prob-
ably arrange a single workshop involving all such infor-
mants. We will submit presentations to national and
regional conferences and organisations aimed at service
providers, professional bodies and professional leaders,
for instance the NHS Confederation. We will maintain a
website publishing the main research ﬁndings. We will
also submit papers to peer reviewed journals and to aca-
demic and scientiﬁc conferences, prioritising open-
access publication.
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